Proverbs. McFarland recalls the idea that evil is a privation
of being or the good, and the book of Proverbs appears to support such an idea.
In Proverbs, evil equates to actions or dispositions that lead to destructive
consequences. The distinction is between the wise person, who is connected with
the order of things and in tune with the Wisdom by which God created all
things, and the foolish person, who disregards the order of things and lives in
a way that undermines his or her own existence. The destructive consequences of
the foolish person’s actions entail that person’s suffering, in which God may
be seen as ‘reprov[ing] the one he loves’ (Prov. 3:12; remember, according to
McFarland, Proverbs connects evil to ‘foolish’ actions or dispositions, not with the consequences of those
actions or dispositions). Thus evil does not come from God; nor is it intrinsic
to creation. Rather, evil – and Proverbs is only really concerned with moral evil – arises from humans rejecting
God and refusing God’s ways.
Job. McFarland introduces his overview of Job with an
observation that true worship of God is largely thanksgiving. This is a
position necessitated by the doctrine of creation from nothing, which testifies
to the fact that all things, including existence itself, are given by God. Giving
thanks is the proper attitude and response towards God for everything we
receive. But how should we regard loss, especially the sudden, violent loss
experienced by Job? Like the goodness in his life to that point, Job believes
the woe he suffers is from God’s hand, and none of the narrative elements in
the book of Job appear to correct him. Thus Job is not concerned to charge God
with evil; his focus is rather on seeking an explanation for his predicament,
given that he is innocent of wrongdoing. However, God isn’t persuaded that a
definitive explanation constitutes the best response to Job, and the concluding
chapters appear to suggest that a humble relationship with God is what matters
most in the face of catastrophe. The only ‘answer’ to Job’s questions that
matters is God.
Ecclesiastes. Neither Proverbs nor Job addresses natural or
systemic evil. For both of these books, evil is somehow related to agency,
whether divine or human. However, Ecclesiastes appears to locate evil within
the created structures of the world itself. This is not a problem at face
value, for Ecclesiastes is convinced that there is a time for everything, and everything
is good in its time. But time passes. And so everything is subject to vanity,
to meaninglessness, to futility – and this is evil, an insubstantial evil.
According to McFarland, an understanding of creaturely finitude that posits
each creature’s place in space and time is not a problem in and of itself, but
it does suggest that the goodness of creation is not equivalent to its
perfection, which is ultimately an eschatological concept. It is only when God
eschatologically transforms the conditions of creaturely existence so that each
creature can flourish without jeopardising the integrity or reality of other
creatures that creation can be said to be perfect(ed). McFarland draws from
Romans 8:19-25 to counterbalance the realism/pessimism of Ecclesiastes.
As I said earlier, I find some of McFarland’s more general
conclusions about evil to be commonplace. Moreover, I didn’t detect any
explanation or account of the distinction between suffering and evil, which I
think would further clarify McFarland’s own thoughts. And the
Trinitarian–Christological emphasis that has permeated From Nothing to this point is noticeably absent – though that could
be due simply to McFarland’s reliance upon Old Testament literature. However, the
strength of the chapter lies in McFarland’s recognition that Proverbs, Job, and
Ecclesiastes each has its own take on the problem of evil (Proverbs: evil is
due to human ‘foolishness’; Job: God is (unfathomably and transcendently)
sovereign over evil; Ecclesiastes: evil is the futility of finitude) and that
the canon of Scripture does nothing to smooth the sometimes-jarring
distinctions between them other than to point to their eschatological
resolution (Rom. 8). This in itself poses an interesting question for me: If
creaturely finitude locates a creature in a particular space and time, then (a)
does the creature’s eschatological renewal do away with its spatio-temporal
locatedness; and (b) will the concept of creaturely finitude therefore be done away
with, too? I’m all for thinking that the age to come has its own physics, and
perhaps McFarland will address matters of this sort in his later chapter on
‘Glory’.
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